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Policy recommendations
\ Reframe the discourse on non-state 
armed groups 
The discourse on Mali, which is currently driven by 
counter-terrorist rhetoric, needs to be reframed. It  
has to shift from fighting terrorism to broader multi- 
dimensional peacebuilding. Stabilisation policy in Mali 
needs to avoid a too narrow programmatic focus on 
preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE). 
International stabilisation actors, the Malian govern-
ment and civil society need to develop and strengthen 
programmes and tools addressing the root causes that 
drive non-state armed groups to use violence. 
\ Address root causes of the conflict 
and respond to grievances non-state 
actors have
Taking a broader perspective in dealing with non-state 
armed actors in Mali requires a better analysis of the 
grievances these actors have. The government, supported 
by the international community, needs to work on 
strategies that acknowledge and better respond to  
these grievances rather than primarily focusing on ‘ 
defeating terrorists’ through military security approaches. 
International assistance to other policy areas must be 
conditioned upon political will on the side of the Malian 
government to address the root causes of the conflict. 
\ Get agreement on integration 
modalities before advancing with global 
DDR in Mali   
There is an urgent  requirement to endorse the Presi-
dential decree on the modalities of the allocation of 
ranks, command functions, and the reclassification of 
ex-combatants of signatory movements in the rele-
vant structures established by the state, including the 
army and security forces. If first tranches of ex-com-
batants are not successfully (re-)deployed, the United 
Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization  
Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) and the government need 
to halt and  reconsider the pilot process.
\ Progress in security sector reform is a 
prerequisite for DDR
DDR has to be more closely tied to progress in reforming 
the Malian security sector. Distrust in the state and its 
failure to provide protection have been quoted as one 
of the main drivers of armed conflict in Mali. Integrating 
more individuals into a force that lacks accountability 
and oversight mechanisms might indeed worsen the 
problem rather than solving it. International assistance 
to the DDR process should be conditioned upon gov-
ernment efforts to enhance the capacity of the military 
justice system and the strengthening of the oversight 
role of civil society and parliament.
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The Algiers Peace Agreement concluded in 2015 con-
stitutes the framework for the disarmament, demobi-
lisation and reintegration (DDR) process in Mali. Up 
to now, there has been some progress in implement-
ing DDR-relevant provisions of the peace accord. 
In terms of achievements, a National DDR Commission 
(Commission Nationale de DDR, CNDDR) and Inte-
gration Commission have been established. The  
CNDDR is meant to work closely with the Ministry of 
Reconciliation and Peace and the Comité de Suivi de 
l’accord (CSA) that has been put in place to oversee 
the implementation of the peace accord. Its sub-com-
mittee on Defence and Security (SCDS) works on the 
recommendations of the Comité technique de secu-
rité (CTS), which amongst others observes the cease-
fire agreement and supports the integration process 
of ex-combatants. The Integration Commission in  
coordination with the CNDDR has worked out eligi-
bility criteria for the DDR process. These are comple-
mented by a reinsertion strategy which has been  
developed by the CNDDR in close conjunction with 
the World Bank.
In addition to the setup of these institutions and the 
work on strategic aspects of the future DDR programme, 
eight cantonment sites were fully constructed with 
the help of the MINUSMA assessed budget and Peace 
Building Support Office. While some of the sites are 
currently guarded by signatory armed groups, these 
have never been utilised for DDR purposes, given 
pending DDR operations.
This also means that the Operational Coordination 
Mechanism (MOC, Mécanisme Opérationnel de Coor-
dination)1 , which is composed of members of signa-
tory armed movements and the Malian Armed Forces 
 (FAMa), has never fulfilled one of its original purposes: 
 
 
1 \ After an agreement between the parties in July 2016 on 
the conditions of implementation and deployment of the 
MOC in the regions of Gao, Kidal and  Timbuktu, the first 
MOC was established in January 2017 in Gao. The MOCs in 
Timbuktu and Kidal were finally established in May 2018 
(Savey &Boisvert, 2019).
 the provision of security to the cantonment sites 
during the DDR process as envisaged by the Agree-
ment for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali. Since the 
wider DDR process has not started yet, the MOC bat-
talions could not be deployed to the cantonment sites. 
Their task was, therefore, limited to conducting joint 
patrols around the MOC camps as a confidence-build-
ing measure. 
Even though several key requirements for DDR are in 
place (institutional framework, key guiding docu-
ments and cantonment sites to assemble the forces), 
the DDR process is years behind schedule. While the 
peace agreement stipulated the establishment of a 
start date for the cantonment process within 30 days 
of signing the agreement, it is currently not clear 
when or if the cantonment sites will ever be used and 
further stages of DDR will be implemented including 
the reinsertion of former fighters into civilian life. 
The registration process, which under the March 2018 
road map was scheduled to close in April 2018 was 
still ongoing by April 2019. At that time, 63,000 eligible 
candidates had been announced by the CNDDR (Cart-
er Center, 2019). A comprehensive and binding time-
table to process this elevated number of combatants 
does not seem to be in place at the given moment. 
The main reason for the delay in starting the wider 
DDR process is connected to the lack of political com-
mitment and the erosion of trust between the signa-
tory parties of the peace agreement. According to the 
Carter Center as the Independent Observer of the im-
plementation of the agreement, “the increasing confi-
dence established between the Malian parties since 
early 2018 is now dwindling. The erosion of trust has 
contributed to the continuation of the longstanding 
problem of the parties’ lack of follow-through on com-
mitments” (Carter Center, 2019). This also applies to 
commitments that were made in relation to the DDR 
and the security sector reform (SSR) process. 
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Although the Malian army and security forces are 
probably in a better state today than before the 2012 
crisis due to capacity-building efforts by a range of 
stakeholders such as the European Union Training 
Mission in Mali (EUTM), European Capacity Building 
Mission (EUCAP), France, the United States and 
MINUSMA, its human rights records remain poor.  
According to reports of human rights organisations, 
the Malian army has been accused of numerous viola-
tions of human rights and international humanitarian 
law including enforced disappearance, extrajudicial 
killings, torture and arbitrary arrest, particularly  
in the course of its counter-terrorist operations in 
northern Mali. 
Meanwhile, the backdoor for the signatory armed 
groups to resort to violence still seems to be open.  
For example, the fact that neither the Coordination  
of Azawad Movements (CMA) nor the Platform (pro- 
government platform of armed militias) contributed 
heavy weapons to the MOC battalions—as previously 
agreed upon in the context of the agreement on the 
modalities of the deployment and operationalisation 
of the MOC—is an indicator for this. Claims that heavy 
weapons in Mali are not in circulation are rather  
unrealistic given their inflow into Mali after the fall of 
the Gaddafi regime and the return of Tuareg soldiers 
who had been in his employ (Conflict Armament  
Research & Small Arms Survey, 2013; Larémont, 2013; 
Conflict Armament Research, 2016). 
Mali’s ‘accelerated’ DDR/Integration 
programme
Due to the political challenges in starting the wider 
DDR process, but also faced with mounting tensions 
in the country, rising insecurity associated with the 
continuing terrorist threat and an urgent need to dis-
arm and demobilise ex-combatants in the north, the 
CNDDR with the support of MINUSMA launched a 
DDR pilot process, called ADDR-I (Accelerated disar-
mament, demobilisation and reintegration/integra-
tion) in November 2018. This is a fast track integra-
tion process that intends to train combatants from 
the MOC and to eventually redeploy them into the 
reconstituted Malian defence and security forces, the 
overall target being the integration of 4,900 individuals, 
including 900 persons who deserted from the Malian 
Armed Forces in 2012. 
As to its disarmament component, the programme 
follows a “one man, one weapon” policy, which implies 
the mandatory handover of one or more weapons 
upon registration of each ex-combatant. 
While the peace agreement stipulates the integration 
of demobilised combatants into the MDSF or long-
term socio-economic reinsertion into civilian life, the 
accelerated DDR/I process only foresees the option of 
integrating the beneficiaries into the armed forces. 
Those ex-combatants who were assessed medically 
unfit during registration for the ADDR-I pilot pro-
gramme are meant to await the launch of the socio- 
economic reinsertion programme by the CNDDR.
Particularly when travelling outside of Bamako, the  
information the signatory movements have about the 
larger DDR programme appears to be limited. Members 
of the MOC coordination office in Gao at least indicated 
that they had little information about the process  
envisioned for those individuals who are to be reinte-
grated into civilian life. This lack of information on 
the ‘local level’ may be connected to the fact that in 
Mali there is—like in many other post- conflict set-
tings—a certain mismatch between the political 
leadership in the capital that is taking decisions and 
the military leadership on the regional and local 
level. 
The flow of information on the DDR process between 
the national and local level is aggravated even further 
by the lack of presence of the National DDR Commis-
sion in these areas. Although the CNDDR maintains 
field offices and is meant to maintain a permanent 
presence in the regions, its reach beyond Bamako 
seems to be limited. This implies that other key actors 
working on DDR matters, like MINUSMA, at times  
do not have a national counterpart on the local  
level with whom challenges can be discussed and 
solutions found. 
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in-between. This insecurity about quotas is risky and 
may even be harmful to the DDR process, as ex-com-
batants may be trained, redeployed to the north, only 
to find their status challenged in the face of new dis-
cussions over quotas. 
Due to these challenges, it will be all the more crucial 
to carefully assess the outcome of the accelerated 
DDR/I programme before advancing with the global 
DDR process in Mali. 
If first tranches of ex-combatants are not successfully 
integrated and (re-)deployed, the current DDR process 
needs to be halted and reconsidered. It is, therefore, 
urgently required to endorse the decree on the modal-
ities of the allocation of ranks, command functions 
and the reclassification of ex-combatants of signatory 
movements in the relevant structures established by 
the state, including the army and security forces. The 
decree was adopted by the Council of Ministers on  
9 October 2019 and is awaiting endorsement by the 
President. Even more importantly, the actors respon-
sible for implementing the decree and associated  
action plan must also act upon it. This may sound 
self-evident, but in a country where the government 
is highly contested, it is not at all certain that its deci-
sions will indeed be accepted by all military levels 
and translated into action. The endorsement and im-
plementation of the decree and action plan should be 
condition for any further capacity- building assistance 
to the MDSF and international financial support to 
processing further tranches of ex-combatants in the 
context of the accelerated DDR/I programme as well 
as the wider DDR process. 
After demobilisation, those ex-combatants who were 
screened and assessed medically fit in the accelerated 
programme receive a six-week basic military training 
at the various training centres in Tiby, Banokoro,  
Mapho and Markala in Segou region and Koulikoro  
in Koulikoro region. As of 2 September 2019, a total of 
1,006 out of 1,840 ex-combatants have completed the 
basic training and integrated into MDSF (more 
ex-combatants are currently being trained, others are 
expected to take part in a last catch-up phase). Once 
redeployed, they will be required to undertake a six-
week specialised training in their various units. 
Although a plan (2019-2021) for progressive redeploy-
ment2  of MOC ex-combatants has been drafted by  
MINUSMA along with the Malian Armed Forces,  
following a request from the Malian Chief of General 
Staff, it remains to be seen whether the demobilised 
individuals will indeed have key functions and be  
redeployed as full members of the MDSF. 
For the newly integrated units it is going to be impor-
tant that these will have constructive tasks. A lack  
of ‘real’ engagement bears the risks that crime rates 
increase in those areas where former MOC members 
are deployed. At least in Gao and the surrounding  
areas, the rise in crime (e.g. cars and arms theft) has 
been a major problem since the MOC process started. 
Apart from the question of how integrated ex-com-
batants will be used, there is little clarity regarding the 
ceiling for integration. Up to the time of writing, the 
final quota of fighters to be integrated through the 
DDR process, which has to be decided by the  
subcommittee on defence and security, is contested. 
While the Malian military in the past propagated for 
a ceiling of around 5,000 individuals, the signatory 
groups aimed at a much higher figure (around 
10,000). A compromise which the CNDDR, too, is  
likely to support might eventually be found somewhere 
 
2 \  The draft document adopted by the Malian Armed Forces was reviewed 
and approved by the 41st CTS meeting on 25 September 2019. This docu-
ment is awaiting final adoption by the Sub Committee on Defense and 
Security of the CSA before implementation.
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Enhancing democratic control and accountability of 
Mali’s security sector is one of the most important 
steps that will need to be taken. The violations of the 
state security forces against the Malian citizens are 
undermining the trust the average citizen still has in 
its state and its security organs. Distrust in the state 
and its failure to provide protection has been quoted 
as one of the main drivers of armed conflict in Mali. 
Integrating more individuals into a force that lacks 
accountability and oversight mechanisms might 
worsen the problem rather than solving it. 
Dealing with groups labelled as 
‘terrorists’
So far, the discussion about DDR in Mali has primarily 
focused on signatory and compliant armed groups. 
Other non-state armed groups falling under the label 
‘terrorist’ or ‘jihadist’, the so-called terrorist armed 
groups, are not captured by the DDR framework as 
outlined in the Algiers agreement. 
The fact that the discourse in Mali distinguishes  
between ‘jihadist’ and ‘non-jihadist’ groups is quite 
misleading though, as conflict lines at times overlap, 
and the differentiation between ‘jihadist’ and ‘non- 
jihadist’ groups (signatory and compliant) is not  
always so clear cut as presented. “Fighters often pass 
back and forth between all types of groups, based on 
geography or local circumstances. This fluidity has 
led to frequent allegations that both pro-government 
and formerly separatist or non-jihadist armed groups 
have collaborated with various jihadist groups”  
(Lebovich, 2019). 
Despite this fluidity, the instruments dealing with 
the various armed groups follow well-known path-
ways: The ‘signatory’ and 'compliant' armed groups 
can take part in the DDR process as outlined above. In 
contrast, the handling and treatment of individuals 
previously associated with what is considered a ‘ter-
rorist’ organisation are not included in the category 
of DDR and instead follow prosecution, rehabilitation 
and reintegration requirements. 
The need to ‘accelerate’ the security 
sector reform process 
Even if the decree mentioned above is endorsed, the 
long-term prospects for those who have undergone 
training in the context of the accelerated DDR/I  
programme are still unclear given the absence of  
progress towards the creation and deployment of the 
reconstituted force. According to the assessment of 
conflict analysts in Bamako, the hesitation to move 
towards a reconstituted force is connected to concerns 
within the government and the military that the  
process of building a reconstituted army may spark 
off another crisis. Eligible armed groups also do not 
seem necessarily keen for the integration process  
to be concluded as their bargaining power will be  
reduced once their members have been integrated. 
Such concerns and internal resistance stand in the 
way of promoting a coordinated security sector reform 
(SSR) process in Mali, which needs to be ‘accelerated’ 
to catch up with the pilot DDR process already under-
way. Currently, it is essential to achieve progress on 
the reorganisation of the MDSF and to implement the 
National Security Sector Reform Strategy which has 
been adopted. 
Up to today, Malians have seen very limited results in 
the field of security sector reform. As in many other 
areas, the government in the past has given priority 
to capacity-building measures over structural reforms. 
Like in the field of DDR, primarily formal technical 
measures have been taken, such as the formation of a 
National Council for the Reform of the Security Sector. 
But the political will to back these institutions needs 
to be in place for them to be effective. Overall, the gov-
ernment has shown limited interest in substantive 
reforms aimed at professionalising the security sector 
(Tull, 2017). The capacity-building measures that were 
targeted at the state security forces did not prevent 
human rights abuses by the Malian Armed Forces 
against the civilian population. In fact, “the number 
of serious violations of international human rights 
and humanitarian law by state security forces in the 
context of counterterrorism operations increased  
significantly in 2018” (Human Rights Watch, 2019). 
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In the latter context and as part of counter-terrorism 
activities, many individuals in Mali have been arrested 
and accused of terrorism-related charges in the past 
years (ICCT/UNICRI, 2017). To the knowledge of the 
author, the Malian government has not yet developed 
a structured approach for the risk assessment and 
screening of individuals connected to violent extrem-
ism. Civil society actors close to this process are at 
least reporting that individuals regarded as ‘violent 
extremists’ in custody of the authorities are still “put 
into the same box”. Plans to look into the categorisation 
of these individuals are, however, underway. The  
Ministry of Religious Affairs has also developed a  
national strategy for the prevention and countering 
of violent extremism (P/CVE) (2018-2020) and an  
action plan. Prevention activities are ongoing and 
supported by international actors such as MINUSMA 
as well as civil society. 
These activities aimed at preventing and countering 
violent extremism are independent of the DDR pro-
cess in Mali as outlined above. This is much in line 
with how it works in other similar conflict settings 
that involve groups that carry the label ‘terrorists’. 
What is, however, overlooked in this regard is the 
fluidity that has been mentioned earlier: The lines 
between armed groups, the so-called ‘jihadist’ and 
others, can become blurred due to changes in leader-
ship, splintering and re-alignments. At times, there 
may be striking similarities between what one would 
call a ‘terrorist’ and a regular armed group member. 
Of course, these groups do have different ideologies, 
purposes and modi operandi, and there are different 
legal requirements and frameworks in place to deal 
with them. But when taking a closer look at the root 
causes that are driving people in Mali to join non-
state armed groups in the first place, these may at 
times overlap for those individuals termed ‘terrorists’ 
and those who are part of a ‘non-jihadist’ group. The 
so-called ‘jihadist’ groups in Mali are said to have “at-
tempted to attract new recruits by offering financial 
incentives to Malians, many of whom live in extreme 
poverty […] [and] through capitalizing on ethnic and 
regional divisions within the country” (Counter Ter-
rorism Project, 2019). The recruitment into armed 
groups labelled as ‘terrorists’ is deeply entangled 
with the lack of governance, state repression, the 
split of the country into three parts (the north, the 
centre and the south), the war economy and the lack 
of livelihood options and the social opportunities 
that they enable (e.g. marriage). 
Debates over grievances would obviously require  
direct communication also with ‘jihadist’ actors (such 
as Katiba Macina) in Mali. Claims to negotiate with 
them “potentially aiming first for local ceasefires 
and other means of mitigating civilian suffering 
before broadening the scope” (International Crisis 
Group, 2019) have thus become louder but have so far 
remained unanswered by the Malian government. 
Conclusion
Instead of putting non-state armed groups in Mali 
into boxes, thereby limiting the ‘tools’ that can be 
used to address them, it makes sense to take legiti-
mate claims of socio-political marginalisation and 
calls for improved governance in Mali more seriously—
independent of the ideological motivation a group 
has. Addressing grievances of non-state armed actors 
in Mali is nothing that a DDR programme can deal 
with on its own, but this is an area that the Malian 
government will need to invest more resources in  
and open the debate up to. If this is not taken into 
account, any DDR programme will be anything else 
but sustainable. 
Such a call to better address the grievances of armed 
non-state actors in Mali is certainly not new. Previous 
research, also into individual trajectories to violent 
extremism in Mali, has already provided evidence 
“that a lack of trust in state and security forces, plus 
injustice, self-protection and economic hardship are 
the primary drivers of people’s readiness to take up 
arms” (International Alert, 2016) and that it is neces-
sary to look beyond the label of terrorism in Mali. But 
somehow, this call has not reached the policy level 
which is still much influenced by counter-terrorist 
terminology. 
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It is, therefore, necessary to reframe the discourse 
about Mali. The narrative of ‘bringing terrorists to jus-
tice’ feeds into the stigmatisation of members of these 
groups and hence leaves limited room for manoeuvre 
in dealing with them. The discourse will need to shift 
from fighting terrorism to broader multi-dimensional 
peacebuilding. Part and parcel of this is to move away 
from the narrow programmatic focus on P/CVE and 
‘fighting the terrorist’ towards addressing the griev-
ances of non-state armed groups at large. 
To achieve this broader perspective, the linkages, ex-
isting and potential overlaps between DDR and P/CVE 
including their connections and synergies with the 
overall peace process need to be better understood.  
At the time of writing, DDR and P/CVE are regarded  
as separate processes, yet there are direct linkages  
between these two approaches of dealing with non-
state armed violence. What is required is a strategy 
that takes into account these various programmatic 
elements and which at the same time provides an 
overarching-long term vision how to address non-
state armed violence in Mali. 
The wider DDR programme only makes sense if there 
is significant progress in forming the reconstituted 
MDSF and security sector reform. Without achieve-
ments in these areas, starting DDR might even be 
harmful, as integrated individuals will be unclear 
about their purpose, function and status within the 
MDSF. To build trust of the average Malian citizen in 
the state and its security organs, security sector assis-
tance needs to have a stronger focus on making sure 
that members of the MDSF adhere to human rights, 
and on enhancing the capacity of the military justice 
system as well as strengthening the oversight role of 
civil society and parliament. 
Moreover, DDR will also need to look beyond the  
existing peace agreement and address violence in the 
central region of Mali. In the absence of a DDR frame-
work for armed groups in the centre, one potential 
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way forward is to conduct disarmament and violence 
reduction activities targeting the communities at 
large. To be meaningful and to have a sustainable 
impact, such measures would, however, need to be 
closely linked with other stabilisation and develop-
ment efforts in that region. 
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